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The numbers of security vulnerabilities that are being found today are much higher in 
applications than in operating systems. This means that the attacks aimed at web 
applications are exploiting vulnerabilities at the application level and not at the transport 
or network level like common attacks from the past. At the same time, quantity and 
impact of security vulnerabilities in such applications has grown as well. Many 
transactions are performed online with various kinds of web applications. Almost in all of 
them user is authenticated before providing access to backend database for storing all the 
information. A well-designed injection can provide access to malicious or unauthorized 
users and mostly achieved through SQL injection and Cross-site scripting (XSS).  
In this thesis we are providing a vulnerability scanning and analyzing tool of various 
kinds of SQL injection and Cross Site Scripting (XSS) attacks. Our approach can be used 
with any web application not only the known ones. As well as it supports the most 
famous Database management servers, namely MS SQL Server, Oracle, and MySQL.  
We validate the proposed vulnerability scanner by developing experiments to measure its 
performance. We used some performance metrics to measure the performance of the 
scanner which include accuracy, false positive rate, and false negative rate. We also 






عدد الثغرات األمنية التي يتم العثور عمييا اليوم ىي أعمى بكثير مما كانت عميو في تطبيقات نظم التشغيل. ىذا 
غالل نقاط الضعف عمى مستوى التطبيق وليس عمى مستوى يعني أن اليجمات التي تستيدف تطبيقات الويب واست
في الوقت نفسو، نمت كمية وتأثير و من الماضي.  أصبحت مثل اليجمات المشتركة ات الحاسوبشبكالنقل أو 
يتم تنفيذ العديد من المعامالت عبر اإلنترنت مع أنواع وحيث انو . بشكل كبيرتطبيقات ىذه الالثغرات األمنية في 
فانو من  مصادقة المستخدم قبل توفير إمكانية الوصول إلى قاعدة البياناتعمما بأنو يتم مختمفة من تطبيقات الويب. 
سيوفر الولوج ليذه االنظمة الحصول عمى معمومات ميمة، ان عممية  تصميما جيدا مصممخالل نظام حقن ثغرات 
 .Cross Site Scripting و SQL Injectionالحقن االساسية تتم من خالل تقنيتي 
في ىذا البحث، قمنا بتصميم وتطوير نظام مسح وكشف لمثغرات االمنية الخاصة بانظمة الويب، يستطيع النظام 
بيق الويب . كما وانو غير مقيد بنوع تطCross Site Scripting و SQL Injectionاكتشاف الثغرات من نوعي 
 و MS SQL Serverوانما يمكن استخدامو لكافة انظمة الويب. مع الدعم الكامل الشير انظمة قواعد البيانات 
Oracle  و MySQL. 
يقاييس االداء االساسيت نهزا تى ػًم فحص وتقييى نهفكشة انًطشوحت ين خالل تجاسب شايهت نقياس االداء. تى استخذاو 
اننىع ين االنظًت وهي، يقياس انذقت، يقياس يؼذل االيجابيت انكاربت، و يقياس يؼذل انسهبيت انكاربت. كًا وتى يقاسنت 

















A "computer system" is more than hardware and software; it includes the policies, 
procedures, and organization under which that hardware and software is used. 
Security holes can arise from many areas or combination of these them. This leads no 
sense to restrict the study of vulnerabilities to hardware and software problems [67]. 
When attacker breaks into a computing system, he takes advantage of lapses in 
procedures, technology, or management (or some combination of 
those factors), permitting unauthorized access or actions. The precise failure of the 
controls is termed a vulnerability or security flaw; mistreatment that failure to 
violate the security policy is termed exploiting the vulnerability. One who attempts to 
exploit the vulnerability is called an attacker [67]. 
Another more general definition from [68] defines Vulnerability analysis as ―the act 
of determining which security holes and vulnerabilities may be applicable to the 
target network‖. 
Vulnerability analysis, also known as vulnerability assessment [69], ―is a process that 
defines, identifies, and classifies the security holes (vulnerabilities) in a computer, 
network, or communications infrastructure‖. In addition, vulnerability analysis can 
forecast the effectiveness of proposed countermeasures and evaluate their actual 
effectiveness after they are put into use.  
 
Vulnerability analysis consists of several steps: 
 Define and classify target system. 
 Assign relative levels of importance to the target system resources. 
 Identify potential threats to each resource. 
 Develop or setup a method to deal with the most serious potential problems. 
 Define and implement procedures to minimize the consequences if the attack 
for the target system resource. 
In order to develop reliable and robust web applications, we have to use vulnerability 
metrics that let us monitor, analyze, and quantify application behavior under a range 




web applications vulnerability in real time. This scanner lets us quantify how attacks 
and faults impact network performance and services, discover attack points, and 
examine how critical the web application components behave during an attack or 
system fault. 
1.2. Attack analysis 
 
Most network attackers overcome the target system with a brute forced traffic to 
consume all system resources (such as CPU cycles, memory, network bandwidth, and 
packet buffers). These attacks degrade service and can eventually lead to a complete 
shutdown. 
There are two common types of attacks [72]:  
 Server attacks: these attacks include TCP SYN, Smurf IP, ICMP flood, and Ping 
of Death attacks. For example, the attacker may make brute force requests to a 
victim server with spoofed source IP addresses. Due to TCP/IP protocol stack 
vulnerabilities, the victim server cannot complete the connection requests and 
wastes all of its system resources. This will result denial of service on the target 
attacked system. 
 Routing attacks: the main strategy in routing attacks is distributed denial-of-
service (DDoS) attacks which focuses on routers devices. When a router is 
compromised, it will forward traffic according to the attackers’ intent. Similar to 
server attacks, the attackers aim to consume all router resources, forcing the router 
to drop all incoming packets, thus negatively affecting network performance and 
behavior. 
Vulnerability Analysis researches in networks and internet still in its beginning; this 
gives researchers much room for improvements. Several tools, which are based on 
modeling network specifications, fault trees, graph models, and performance models, 
works on vulnerability analysis by checking logs of systems and monitor performance 







There are three common types of vulnerability analysis techniques [72]:  
 Network specifications survivability analysis. This approach injects fault and 
intrusion events into a given network specification, and then visualizes the effects 
in scenario graphs. This is done by using model checking, Bayesian analysis, and 
probabilistic analysis, which provides a multifaceted network view of a desired 
service. 
 Attack trees. This approach determines which attacks are most feasible and 
therefore most likely in a given environment, and quantifies vulnerability by 
mapping known attack scenarios into trees. Attack trees assume that all 
vulnerability paths are known and can be defined as possible or impossible. This 
can change as new attacks are discovered, however, to sudden render a previously 
impossible node possible. 
 Graph-based network-vulnerability analysis. This approach analyzes risks to 
specific network assets and examines the possible consequences of a successful 
attack. As input, the analysis system requires a database of common attacks 
(broken into atomic steps), specific network configuration and topology 
information, and an attacker profile. Nodes identify an attack stage, such as the 
machine class the attacker has accessed and the user privilege level he or she was 
compromised. Using graph methods lets you identify the attack paths with the 
highest probability of success. 
1.3. Penetration Testing 
 
A penetration test is ―an authorized attempt to violate specific constraints stated 
in the form of a security or integrity policy‖. This method implies a metric for 
determining whether the study has succeeded. In addition, it provides a 
framework in which to examine those aspects of procedural, operational, and 
technological security mechanisms relevant to protecting the particular aspect of 
system security in question.  
Another study does not have a specific target; instead, the goal is to find some 




strength of such a test depends on the proper interpretation of results. Briefly, if 
the vulnerabilities are categorized and studied, and if conclusions are drawn as to 
the nature of the flaws, then the analysts can draw conclusions about the care 
taken in the design and implementation. But a simple list of vulnerabilities, 
although helpful in closing those specific holes, contributes far less to the security 
of a system. 
In practice, penetration testing study is affected by many constraints; resources 
and time are the most constraints that affect it. If these constraints arise as aspects 
of policy, they improve the test because they make it more realistic. 
1.4. Layers of Penetration Testing 
 
Penetration testing is designed to characterize the effectiveness of security 
mechanisms and controls to attackers. Attacker’s point of view conducts 
penetration test studies, and the environment in which the tests are conducted is 
that in which a putative attacker would function. Different attackers, however, 
have different environments; for example, insiders have access to the system, 
whereas outsiders need to acquire that access. There are two layers for a 
penetration testing study, external attacker with access to the system and internal 
attacker with access to the system. 
1. External attacker with access to the system: in this layer, in order to launch the 
attack the testers/attacker have access to the system and can proceed to log in or 
to invoke network services available to all hosts on the network. This layer 
requires an access account from which the testers can achieve their goal or using a 
network service that can give them access to the system. Common forms of attack 
at this stage are guessing passwords, looking for unprotected accounts, and 
attacking network servers. To provide the desired access an implementation of 
flaws in servers are required. 
2. Internal attacker with access to the system: in this layer, the testers have an 
account on the system and can act as authorized users of the system. The test 
typically involves gaining unauthorized privileges or information and, from that, 




the target system, its design, and its operation. Attacks are developed on the basis 
of this knowledge and access. 
In some cases, information about specific layers is irrelevant and that layer can be 
skipped. For example, penetration tests during design and development skip layer 
1 because that layer analyzes site security. A penetration test of a system with a 
guest account will usually skip layer 2 because users already have access to the 
system. Ultimately, the testers must decide which layers are appropriate. 
1.5. Methodology at Each Layer in Penetration Testing Methodology 
 
The penetration testing methodology springs from the Flaw Hypothesis 
Methodology. The usefulness of a penetration study comes from the 
documentation and conclusions drawn from the study and not from the success or 
failure of the attempted penetration. Such a conclusion can only be drawn once 
the study is complete and when the study shows poor design, poor 
implementation, or poor procedural and management controls. Also important is 
the degree of penetration. If an attack obtains information about one user's data, it 
may be deemed less successful than one that obtains system privileges because 
the latter attack can compromise many user accounts and damage the integrity of 
the system. 
 
1.6. Flaw Hypothesis Methodology 
 
The Flaw Hypothesis Methodology was developed at System Development 
Corporation and provides a framework for penetration studies [67]. It consists of 
five steps, information gathering, flaw hypothesis, flaw testing, flaw 
generalization, and flaw elimination. 
1. Information gathering. In this step, the testers become familiar with the system's 
functioning. They examine the system's design, its implementation, its operating 





2. Flaw hypothesis. Drawing on the knowledge gained in the first step and on 
knowledge of vulnerabilities in other systems, the testers hypothesize flaws of the 
system under study. 
3. Flaw testing. The testers test their hypothesized flaws. If a flaw does not exist (or 
cannot be exploited), the testers go back to step 2. If the flaw is exploited, they 
proceed to the next step. 
4. Flaw generalization. Once a flaw has been successfully exploited, the testers 
attempt to generalize the vulnerability and find others similar to it. They feed their 
new understanding (or new hypothesis) back into step 2 and iterate until the test is 
concluded. 
5. Flaw elimination. The testers suggest ways to eliminate the flaw or to use 
procedural controls to ameliorate it. 
1.7. Vulnerability Classification 
 
Security flaws from various perspectives are described by vulnerability 
classification frameworks. Some frameworks describe vulnerabilities by 
classifying the techniques used to exploit them. Other frameworks characterize 
vulnerabilities in terms of the software and hardware components and interfaces 
that make up the vulnerability. And others classify vulnerabilities by their nature; 
this is done by discovering techniques for finding previously unknown 
vulnerabilities. 
Vulnerability analysis goal is to develop methodologies that provide the following 
abilities: 
1. Specify, Design, and implement a computer system without vulnerabilities. 
2. Analyze a computer system to detect vulnerabilities. 
3. Address any vulnerability introduced during the operation of the computer 
system. 





1.8. Aim of this Thesis 
 
The main goal of this master thesis is to present a new analyzing tool for main two 
web applications vulnerabilities, which are mainly SQL Injection and Cross Site 
Scripting (XSS). To achieve this goal, a dynamically generate test requests that are 
applied specifically to a given web application will be applied by the analysis tool. By 
doing this analysis, our scanning will be apple to detect vulnerabilities of any web 
application regardless if it’s for known web application or custom web application. 
The analysis tool will conduct two tests; these t101ests will identify the common web 
applications vulnerabilities that are SQL Injections and Cross Site Scripting (XSS). 
These tests will be applied on web applications input parameters so the tests will be 
parameter-based tests. 
1.9. Methods Used 
 
To accomplish the proposed solution, the following methods have been used in 
sequence: 
 Study the basic principles of web applications vulnerability analysis. 
 Study and learn the main scripting languages used for implementation of code. 
 Review the existing techniques of vulnerability analysis. 
 Identify the major and common vulnerabilities on web applications and study 
their mechanisms. 
 Design a set of related analysis mechanisms and algorithms. 
 Demonstrate the validity of the proposed solution to detect vulnerabilities on 
different types of web applications.  
1.10. Our approach 
 
The new scanning tool has been implemented in Perl scripting language under Linux 
environment. The evaluation method used is an automatic exploiting for the detected 
vulnerabilities which will verify the existence of vulnerability and minimize the false 




1.11. Organization of this Thesis 
 
The rest of the thesis is organized as follows; Chapter 2 presents a complete review of 
vulnerability analysis with statistics about known vulnerabilities of web applications 
and their impact in web developments. A brief review of well-known scanning and 
analyzing tools of vulnerabilities with detailed description of most modern tools, as 
well as, categories of lately proposed solutions are discussed in chapter 3. Chapter 4 
presents a formal description of our design of analysis tool with required parameters, 
assumptions, and all prerequisite mechanisms needed to make this comprehensive 
work. Validation and evaluation results are provided in chapter 5. The report ends 
with conclusion in chapter 6 which summarizes this thesis and gives some hints for 

















In computer security, vulnerability is a weakness which allows an attacker to 
reduce a system's information assurance. 
Vulnerability is the intersection of three elements: a system susceptibility or flaw, 
attacker access to the flaw, and attacker capability to exploit the flaw [46]. In 
order to exploit vulnerabilities, the attacker must have at least one applicable tool 
or technique that can connect to a system weakness security hole.  
According to NIST SP 800-37, ―vulnerability analysis and assessment is an 
important element of each required activity in the NIST Risk Management 
Framework (RMF)‖. This RMF comprises six steps, into each of which 
vulnerability analysis and assessment is to be integrated [45]: 
 Information System Categorization. 
 Security Controls Selection. 
 Security Controls Implementation. 
 Security Controls Assessments. 
 Information Systems Authorization. 
 Security Controls Monitoring. 
Integration is done by the vulnerability assessment tools, by automating the 
detection, identification, measurement, and understanding of vulnerabilities found 
in ICT components at various levels of a target ICT system or infrastructure. 
Vulnerability is an attribute or characteristic of a component that can be exploited 
by either an external or internal agent (hacker or malicious insider) to violate a 
security policy of (narrow definition) or cause a deleterious result in (broad 
definition) either the component itself, and/or the system or infrastructure of 
which it is apart. Such ―deleterious results‖ include unauthorized privilege 
escalations or data/resource accesses, sensitive data disclosures or privacy 




Such tools are often referred to as vulnerability scanners, because their means of 
vulnerability detection is to scan targets (usually network services and nodes, and 
the operating systems, databases, and/or Web applications residing on those 
nodes) in an attempt to detect known, and in some cases also unknown, 
vulnerabilities [45]. 
Improving the scanning techniques of Web Application scanners will allow them 
to achieve better performance and, therefore, increase their credibility. However, 
in order to understand and improve web application scanners, the common 
vulnerabilities that they aim to detect must be understood first. This chapter is 
organized as follows: how are vulnerability assessments tools work will be 
discussed in Section 2.1, some of the specific vulnerabilities that web application 
scanners attempt to probe for will be discussed in Section 2.2, several of the most 
popular and researched web application scanners will be discussed in Section 2.3. 
2.2 How Vulnerability Assessment Tools Work 
 
Vulnerability assessment tools generally work by attempting to automate the steps 
often employed to exploit vulnerabilities: they begin by performing a ―footprint‖ 
analysis to determine what network services and/or software programs (including 
versions and patch levels) run on the target. The tools then attempt to find 
indicators (patterns, attributes) of, or to exploit vulnerabilities known to exist, in 
the detected services / software versions, and to report the findings that result. 
Caution must be taken when running exploit code against ―live‖ (operational) 
targets, because damaging results may occur. For example, targeting a live Web 
application with a ―drop tables‖ Standard Query Language (SQL) injection probe 
could result in actual data loss. For this reason, some vulnerability assessment 
tools are (or are claimed to be) entirely passive. Passive scans, in which no data is 
injected by the tool into the target, do nothing but read and collect data. In some 
cases, such tools use vulnerability signatures, i.e., patterns or attributes associated 
with the likely presence of a known vulnerability, such as lack of a certain patch 




in usefulness (compared with tools that are not wholly passive) because they can 
only surmise the presence of vulnerabilities based on circumstantial evidence, 
rather than testing directly for those vulnerabilities. 
Most vulnerability assessment tools implement at least some intrusive ―scanning‖ 
techniques that involve locating a likely vulnerability (often through passive 
scanning), then injecting either random data or simulated attack data into the 
―interface‖ created or exposed by that vulnerability, as described above, then 
observing what results. Active scanning is a technique traditionally associated 
with penetration testing, and like passive scanning, is of limited utility when 
performed on its own, as all the injected exploits would be ―blind‖, i.e., they 
would be launched at the target without knowing its specific details or 
susceptibility to the exploits. For this reason, the majority of vulnerability 
assessment tools combine both passive and active scanning; the passive scanning 
is used to discover the vulnerabilities that the target is most likely to contain, and 
the active scanning is used to verify that those vulnerabilities are, in fact, both 
present and exposed as well as exploitable. Determining that vulnerabilities are 
exploitable increases the accuracy of the assessment tool by eliminating the false 
positives, i.e., the instances in which the scanner detects a pattern or attribute 
indicative of a likely vulnerability that which, upon analysis, proves to be either 
(1) not present, (2) not exposed, or (3) not exploitable. It is the combination of 
passive and active scanning, together with increased automation, which has 
rendered automated penetration testing suites more widely useful in vulnerability 
assessment.  
Most vulnerability assessment tools are capable of scanning a number of network 
nodes, including networking and networked devices (switches, routers, firewalls, 
printers, etc.), as well as server, desktop, and portable computers. The 
vulnerabilities that are identified by these tools may be the result of programming 
flaws (e.g., vulnerabilities to buffer overflows, SQL injections, cross site scripting 




tools also provides enough information to enable the user to discover design and 
even architecture flaws. 
The reason for ―specialization‖ of vulnerability assessment tools, e.g., network 
scanners, host scanners, database scanners, Web application scanners, is that to be 
effective, the tool needs to have a detailed knowledge of the targets it will scan. 
Web application and database vulnerability scanners look for vulnerabilities that 
are traditionally ignored by network- or host-level vulnerability scanners [45]. 
Even custom-developed Web application and/or database application often use 
common middleware (e.g., a specific supplier’s Web server, such as Microsoft® 
Internet Information Server [IIS] or Apache®), backends (e.g., Oracle® or 
PostgreSQL), and technologies (e.g., JavaScript®, SQL) that are known or 
considered likely to harbor certain types of vulnerabilities that cannot be 
identified via signature based methods used by network- and host-based 
vulnerability analysis tools. Instead, Web Application scanners and database 
scanners directly analyze the target Web application or database, and attempt to 
perform common attacks against it, such as SQL injections, XSS, least privilege 
violations, etc [45]. 
2.3 Web Vulnerability attack Threats 
 
The numbers of security vulnerabilities that are being found today are much 
higher in applications than in operating systems. This means that the attacks 
aimed at web applications are exploiting vulnerabilities at the application level 
and not at the transport or network level like common attacks from the past[48]. 
The Open Web Application Security Project (OWASP) has put together what is 
considered the definitive standard list of top threats to Web applications. It is 
called ―The OWASP Top 10 Project‖ and it represents a general consensus on the 
major areas of threat by category. The Top 10 threats [Figure 2.1] as they exist 





Injection flaws, such as SQL, OS, and LDAP injection, occur when 
untrusted data is sent to an interpreter as part of a command or query. The 
attacker’s hostile data can trick the interpreter into executing unintended 
commands or accessing unauthorized data. 
2. Cross Site Scripting (XSS): 
XSS flaws occur whenever an application takes untrusted data and 
sends it to a web browser without proper validation and escaping. XSS 
allows attackers to execute scripts in the victim’s browser which can 
hijack user sessions, deface web sites, or redirect the user to malicious 
sites. 
3. Broken Authentication and Session Management: 
Application functions related to authentication and session 
management are often not implemented correctly, allowing attackers to 
compromise passwords, keys, session tokens, or exploit other 
implementation flaws to assume other users’ identities. 
4. Insecure Direct Object References: 
A direct object reference occurs when a developer exposes a 
reference to an internal implementation object, such as a file, directory, or 
database key. Without an access control check or other protection, 
attackers can manipulate these references to access unauthorized data. 
5. Cross-Site Request Forgery (CSRF): 
A CSRF attack forces a logged-on victim’s browser to send a 
forged HTTP request, including the victim’s session cookie and any other 
automatically included authentication information, to a vulnerable web 




generate requests the vulnerable application thinks are legitimate requests 
from the victim. 
6. Security Misconfiguration: 
Good security requires having a secure configuration defined and 
deployed for the application, frameworks, application server, web server, 
database server, and platform. All these settings should be defined, 
implemented, and maintained as many are not shipped with secure 
defaults. This includes keeping all software up to date, including all code 
libraries used by the application. 
7. Insecure Cryptographic Storage: 
Many web applications do not properly protect sensitive data, such 
as credit cards, SSNs, and authentication credentials, with appropriate 
encryption or hashing. Attackers may steal or modify such weakly 
protected data to conduct identity theft, credit card fraud, or other crimes. 
8. Failure to Restrict URL Access: 
Many web applications check URL access rights before rendering 
protected links and buttons. However, applications need to perform similar 
access control checks each time these pages are accessed, or attackers will 
be able to forge URLs to access these hidden pages anyway. 
9. Insufficient Transport Layer Protection: 
Applications frequently fail to authenticate, encrypt, and protect 
the confidentiality and integrity of sensitive network traffic. When they 
do, they sometimes support weak algorithms, use expired or invalid 





10. Invalidated Redirects and Forwards: 
Web applications frequently redirect and forward users to other 
pages and websites, and use untrusted data to determine the destination 
pages. Without proper validation, attackers can redirect victims to 











Figure 2.1: Top 10 Threats 
This list only includes the ten most critical web application risks that exist today, 
but other important vulnerabilities exist, including buffer overflow exploits and 
malicious file execution (included on the previous version of the OWASP Top 10 
for 2007 [47]). Because the total number of web application vulnerabilities that 
exist is extremely large, only the most relevant vulnerabilities are implemented 
and analyzed in this research. The web application vulnerabilities that are most 
relevant to this research include SQL injection, and cross-site scripting (XSS). 





2.3.1 SQL Injection 
 
This section will discuss a brief overview of different kinds of SQL injection 
attacks and their defenses. [48] Describes the basic definition and fundamental 
information regarding SQL injection techniques. 
Attacks 
SQL injection occurs when malicious input is passed into a database interpreter 
without being properly validated or encoded. In this type of attack the client is 
attacking the web server database. The input that the attacker passes into the 
interpreter is crafted to be a legitimate SQL statement, but instead of returning the 
data that the application’s developer intended, the interpreter now returns the data 
requested by the attacker. This type of attack is severe because not only can it 
expose all sensitive user and business related data, but it could even go as far as 
executing operating system commands or giving an attacker complete control of a 
web application. An example of a valid SQL query which displays information 
for the user ―Rami‖ is: 
SELECT info FROM users WHERE username = 'Rami'; 
An attacker could use the malicious user name ―' OR 1=1 –‖ to cause the 
interpreter to display all of the user information data in the database. The 
corresponding SQL query would be: 
SELECT info FROM users WHERE username = '' OR 1=1 – 
This is one of the simplest types of SQL injection, but works because the leading 
single quote causes the query to break out of the single quote delimited data. 
Therefore the always true ―OR 1=1‖ is appended to the query, and thus displays 
all of the user information data in the database. The double dashes ―–‖ at the end 
of the query cause all of the text that would follow it to be commented out, 




Adding the comment symbol is necessary in this attack because it nullifies the rest 
of the syntax that the web application would normally append to the end of 
database query to complete the operation. Therefore, the only query that is being 
executed is the attacker’s injected sequence, and not the web applications 
expected query. 
Even more dangerous attacks are possible against certain SQL versions and 
databases as well. An example of this would be if an attacker took advantage of a 
web application that implements both regular and administrator users, and 
therefore normally logs in users with default roles, but could also log in a user 
with administrator roles. If the administrator user has advanced functionality and 
has the ability to access all of the web application’s data, then the web application 
can be completely compromised if an attacker takes control of the administrator 
account. An SQL injection attack could accomplish this if a web application uses 
email addresses as user names and associates each user name in the database as 
either a regular or an administrator user. In this example the attacker will exploit a 
generic ―Change Mailing Address‖ field on a web page and associate an email 
address of their choosing to the administrator account. The attacker would enter 
the following in the ―Change Mailing Address‖ field on the web page: 
'; UPDATE users SET username = 'attacker@email.com' WHERE 
username LIKE '%admin%'; – 
The semi-colon ―;‖ will end the first query and allow for the attacker’s query to be 
executed. This query will cause the email address that the attacker entered to 
replace the email address that matches the pattern most like ―admin‖. All that is 
necessary to perform this attack is for the attacker to ―guess and check‖ until they 
know that the table holding the accounts is in fact ―users‖, and that the field 
holding the user names is in fact ―username‖. After this, the user name most 
closely matching ―admin‖ will be replaced with the attacker’s email address, but 
will continue to have administrative capabilities. Now that the attacker has 




Password‖ button that most user-based web applications provide, and have the 
administrator’s password sent to him in the convenient ―Password Reminder‖ 
email. 
The previously mentioned attack is not always easy to execute because it is not 
trivial to find out the name of the table and column being used in the SQL 
database. This challenge is overcome by using two other types of SQL injection: 
blind SQL injection and error-based SQL injection. Blind SQL injection uses a 
series of true and false questions to take advantage of the predictability of the 
WHERE condition in SQL, since 1=1 will always return true. Therefore, if a 
record is returned when using blind SQL injection, the attacker’s injected 
condition must have been true. Error-based SQL injection is a specific type of 
SQL injection that uses SQL error messages to determine the structure of the 
database. SQL injection statements are crafted by the attacker in a way such that 
the attacker can use the error responses to systematically unveil table names, 
column names, column data types, and even specific data entries [48]. 
Defenses 
The best way to prevent SQL injection is to have all interpreters separate 
untrusted data from database queries and to only accept expected input [41, 50]. 
In order to achieve this, all data originating from a client should have special 
characters escaped or sanitized into a valid format, should use an API which 
avoids the use of an interpreter entirely, or should use prepared statements and 
parameterized interfaces. The ―mysqli->prepare‖ mechanism will create prepared 
statements for MySQL in PHP, and the following code sequence will escape all 
special characters: 
if ( !get_magic_quotes_gpc() ) { 





Also, to protect against blind SQL injection and error message based SQL 
injection, SQL error reporting should be disabled in conjunction with the other 
safety measures mentioned above. In order to disable error reporting for MySQL 
the ―@‖ character should precede commands to suppress on-screen error 
reporting. These defensive measures should be implemented to mitigate SQL 
injection attacks. 
2.3.2 Cross Site Scripting 
 
Three of the main types of cross-site scripting (XSS) attacks, as well as some 
defensive techniques to protect against them, will be reviewed in this section.  
Attacks 
XSS occurs when a web application includes malicious code in a web page that is 
sent to a client’s browser without proper content validation. In this type of attack 
the web page server is attacking the client machine. When the web page is viewed 
by the client it will execute the malicious script that the attacker embedded into 
the web page. XSS is the most prevalent web application security flaw [47] due in 
a large part to its simplicity and resulting severity. Some of the attacks that this 
type of vulnerability can result in are the hijacking of a user’s session, the 
defacement of websites, the insertion of hostile content, and the redirection of 
users’ requests. 
Reflective XSS is a type of XSS attack that can occur when a victim follows a 
URL which contains malicious scripting that is executed when the web page is 
rendered. This is commonly done by sending victims legitimate looking e-mail 
messages that contain malicious script in the message’s URL. Once the HTTP 
request from the URL is processed, the HTML content is received and displayed 
in the victim’s browser, thus executing the malicious script. An example of a 
URL containing a reflective XSS attack that would execute some type of 





Stored XSS is another type of XSS attack. This type of attack occurs when the 
malicious script is uploaded into the database back end of a server without input 
validation, and is later retrieved by the web application to be embedded into a 
web page. This causes every user who visits the infected web page to execute the 
malicious script in his or her browser. An example of where this vulnerability can 
be found is a web application that uses a comment section to allow users to view 
and leave feedback about a product. If an attacker were to leave a comment which 
included malicious script, the script would be stored as a comment for that 
product in the database, and then executed every time a user clicks to view the 
page holding the comments for that product. An example of this type of attack is a 
script crafted to steal a user’s cookie and save it in a remote site for exploitation at 
a later time so that they can perform actions as if they were the victim (such as 
bank transactions, e-mail correspondence, etc...). The following script would 
execute such an attack if stored in a web application’s database and then executed 
in a client’s web browser: 
<script>document.write('<img src=―http://www.attackersite.com' 
+document.cookie+'―) </script> 
A third type of XSS attack is Document Object Model, or DOM-based, XSS. This 
is a different kind of XSS attack because it occurs on the client side when the user 
is processing the content, instead of on the server side when the web application is 
retrieving information to put in a web page. The Document Object Model is the 
standard model that represents HTML and XML content of a web page. The 
DOM can be modified in this type of attack to execute a malicious script in the 
victim’s browser. An example of this type of attack would be to exploit a web 
page that uses some embedded JavaScript in to set the default language for the 





The malicious script that would exploit this would simply need to replace the 
variable ―English‖ in the URL. A URL that shows this type of DOM-based XSS 
attack would be: 
http://www.mysite.com/index.html#default=<script>malicious()</script> 
Because everything after the # in a URL is not sent to the server by the browser, 
the malicious script would not be detected by the server even if the server was 
performing input validation. Therefore the script would be echoed into the page 
(DOM) when the browser renders it, and would result in the attacker’s script 
being executed [49]. 
Defenses 
The same rules described above that apply to protecting against SQL injection, 
apply to protecting against XSS as well. All user supplied input should be 
validated and properly escaped before being included in the output web page [50]. 
This requires the same escaping technique as before, which in PHP is: 
if ( !get_magic_quotes_gpc() ) { 
$safe_string = mysql_real_escape_string( $original_string ); 
} 
Also, proper output encoding will ensure that the browser treats the possibly 
dangerous content as text, and not as active content that could be executed. The 
―htmlentities()‖ and ―htmlspecialchars()‖ functions in PHP will check output to 
make sure that it is HTML encoded. 
The best way to avoid DOM-based XSS vulnerabilities is to have all client-side 
input passed to the server for proper validation. However, if using variables in the 
DOM cannot be avoided, then input validation should occur in the script itself. A 
check to confirm that the string being written to the HTML page consists of only 
alphanumeric characters should be completed so that no scripting characters are 




viewable in the HTML code to the attackers, and therefore is easily 
understandable and attackable [49]. An example of a script which checks that 
only alphanumeric characters exist in a string is: 
if (original_string.match(/^[a-zA-Z0-9]+$/)) { 
document.write(original_string); 
} 
These defensive techniques, although not infallible due to the mentioned 
limitations, will add a level of protection against attacks that aim to exploit XSS 
vulnerabilities. 
2.4 Web Application Vulnerability Scanners 
 
There are several web application vulnerability scanners that test for popular 
vulnerabilities in web servers and web applications. These tools can either be 
academic research projects, free/open-source applications, or commercial 
software products. Tools are developed in academia by members of universities 
who are interested in improving and studying web application vulnerability 
scanners, but are generally not available for purchase or commercial use. The 
open-source/free tools are available to the public, but are generally not as up-to 
date and accurate as the commercial tools. These tools do however, give users the 
ability to customize their tool and gain a greater understanding of the security of 
their web applications. Commercial tools usually give more comprehensive 
results than open-source/free tools, but can cost anywhere from just under 
$100.00 to over $6000.00 [8, 50]. Specific web vulnerability scanners from these 
three categories that automatically scan for and detect the most common web 
application vulnerabilities will be reviewed in this section. 
2.4.1 Web Application Scanners in Academia 
 




that are developed in academia. These scanners are different from free/open-
source and commercial scanners because the researchers who work on them 
are continuously evaluating them and also discuss not only where their design 
succeeds, but where their design is limited and requires future work. These 
scanners are not available for public use, so they cannot be used in this 
analysis of web vulnerability scanner limitations, but reviewing the techniques 
and methods used by these scanners will help in understanding how other web 
application scanners work [48]. 
Huang et al. developed a web application scanner called WAVES that 
attempts to reduce the number of potential side effects of black-box testing 
[51, 52]. The auditing process of web application scanners can cause 
permanent modifications, or even damage, to the state of the application it is 
targeting. This is a drawback that both commercial and open-source/free web 
application scanners share, and is why the authors introduced a testing 
methodology that would allow for harmless auditing. Their experimental 
results found that WAVES was unable to detect any new vulnerability that 
were not already detected by a static source code analyzer they had developed. 
Also, WAVES was unable to discover all of the vulnerabilities that the static 
source code analyzer had found (detected only 80% of the vulnerabilities 
found by the static analyzer). The authors believe their tool failed in part 
because it did not have complex procedures able to detect all data entry points, 
and because it was unable to observe HTML output. 
Another academic black-box approach was developed by Antunes and Viera 
as described in [53]. Their web vulnerability scanner was used to identify 
SQL injection vulnerabilities in 262 publicly available web services. The first 
step in their approach was to prepare for the tests by obtaining information 
regarding the web service in order to generate the workload (valid web service 
calls). The second step was to execute the tests. This was accomplished by 
using a workload emulator that acted as a web service consumer, and by using 




into the workload test calls. The final step in their approach was to analyze the 
responses by using a set of well-defined rules which would identify 
vulnerabilities and exclude potential false-positives. Their results showed that 
they achieved a detection coverage rate of 81% in the scenario where they had 
access to the known number of vulnerabilities, and maintained a false-positive 
rate of 18% in their optimistic interpretation. These results are better than 
those of the commercial tools that the authors analyzed, and suggest that it is 
possible to improve the effectiveness of vulnerability scanners [48]. 
2.4.2 Free/Open-Source Web Application Scanners 
 
Many open-source and free web application scanners are available for black-
box testing and analysis. Some of these applications provide extensive 
functionality with the ability to be customized and expanded to meet the needs 
of users. Others however do not provide a great deal of usability and have a 
limited amount of functionality, and therefore can only test for a few web 
application vulnerabilities. Three of the more thorough and robust free/open-
source scanners, Grendel-Scan [54], Wapiti [55], and W3AF [56], will be 
reviewed.  
Grendel-Scan [54] is an open-source web application security testing tool 
which has an automated testing module for detecting common web application 
vulnerabilities. It has the ability to find simple web application vulnerabilities, 
but its designers state that no automated tool can identify complicated 
vulnerabilities, such as logic and design flaws. Grendel-Scan tests for SQL 
injection, XSS attacks, and session management vulnerabilities, as well as 
other vulnerabilities. 
Wapiti [55] is a free web application vulnerability scanner and security 
auditor. It performs black-box analysis by scanning the web pages of a web 
application in search of scripts and forms where data can be injected. After the 




scripts are vulnerable. Wapiti scans for remote file inclusion errors, SQL and 
database injections, XSS injections, and other vulnerabilities. 
W3AF [56] is exactly what it stands for, a Web Application Attack and Audit 
Framework. The goal of the project is to create a framework which can find 
and exploit web application vulnerabilities easily. The project’s long term 
objectives are for it to become the best open source web application scanner, 
and the best open source web application exploitation framework. Also, the 
designers want the project to create the biggest community of web application 
hackers, combine static code analysis and black box testing into one 
framework, and become the NMAP [57] of the web. W3AF incorporates a 
great deal of plug-ins into its framework, and is capable of testing for SQL 
injection, XSS attacks, buffer overflow, malicious file execution, and session 
management vulnerabilities. Table 2.1 provides a comparison of the 
vulnerabilities that the free and open source web application scanners search 
for. 
Vulnerability Type  Grendel-Scan Wapiti W3AF 
SQL Injection X X X 
Cross Site Scripting X X X 
Session Management X - - 
Malicious File Execution - X X 
Buffer Overflow - - X 
Table 2.1: A comparison of the relevant vulnerabilities detected by free/open-
source web application scanners. 
2.4.3 Commercial Web Application Scanners 
 
Commercial web application scanners are generally licensed to companies or 
organizations that wish to test their web applications for vulnerabilities so that 
they can fix security holes before they are maliciously exploited. Since a data 




customers, and the loss of millions of dollars, companies are willing to pay 
large sums of money for these applications. These commercial applications 
compete against each other for market share, and therefore do not want to 
disclose their scanner’s limitations or restrictions. However, an approach to 
analyze these limitations and restrictions is proposed in this thesis. Some of 
the features of popular commercial web application scanners will be discussed 
below [48].  
Cenzic [58] sells a web application scanner tool called Hailstorm which 
utilizes stateful testing.  Stateful testing tools are designed to behave like 
human testers by taking what seem to be an application’s insignificant or 
disparate weaknesses, and combining them together into serious exploits. The 
key benefits that Hailstorm claims are the ability to identify major security 
flaws in target applications, to help with internal compliance policies, to avoid 
vulnerabilities that lead to downtime, and to assess applications for commonly 
known vulnerabilities. Cenzic provides a 7-day free trial of Hailstorm Core 
which can detect vulnerabilities including SQL injection, XSS , and session 
management. 
Acunetix Web Vulnerability Scanner [8] is another black-box tool which 
claims in-depth checking for SQL injection, XSS, and other vulnerabilities 
with its innovative AcuSensor Technology. This technology is supposed to 
quickly find vulnerabilities with a low number of false-positives, pinpoint 
where each vulnerability exists in the code, and report the debug information 
as well. Acunetix also includes advanced tools to allow penetration testers to 
fine tune web application security tests, and has many more features to scan 
websites with different scan options and identities. The only vulnerability that 
the free edition of the software detects is XSS, but a 30-day trial version of the 
product is available that also can detect SQL injection, file execution, session 




N-Stalker [59] provides a suite of web security assessment checks to enhance 
the overall security of web applications. It is founded on the technology of 
Component-oriented Web Application Security Scanning, and allows users to 
create their own assessment policies and requirements, enabling them to check 
for more than 39,000 signatures and infrastructure security checks. 
Vulnerabilities checked for include SQL injection, XSS attacks, buffer 
overflows, and session management attacks, but the evaluation edition only 
lasts for a 7-day period. 
Netsparker [60] is a web application vulnerability scanner developed by 
Mavituna Security Ltd. Netsparker is focused on eliminating false-positives, 
and uses confirmation and exploitation engines to ensure that false-positives 
are not reported. The engines also allow the users to see the actual impact of 
the attacks instead of text explanations of what the attack could do. Because of 
the techniques Netsparker uses, Mavituna Security claims that it developed 
the first false-positive free web application scanner. Netsparker scans for all 
types of XSS injection, SQL injection, malicious file execution, and session 
management vulnerabilities. 
Burp Scanner [61] is a web application vulnerability scanner that is part of 
Burp Suite Professional. Burp Suite Professional is the commercial version of 
Burp Suite, which is an integrated platform for attacking and testing web 
applications. Burp Suite provides a number of tools, including an interception 
web proxy, web spider, application intruder, session key analyzer, and data 
comparer. The professional version includes Burp Scanner which can operate 
in either passive or active mode, or either manual scan or live scan mode. The 
vulnerabilities it searches for include SQL injection, XSS injection, and 
session management vulnerabilities. 
Rational AppScan [62] is licensed by IBM for advanced web application 
security scanning. The AppScan tool automates vulnerability assessments and 




web application vulnerabilities. AppScan can generate advanced remediation 
capabilities in order to ease vulnerability remediation, simplify results with 
the Results Expert wizard, and test for emerging web technologies. Rational 
AppScan provides an unlimited evaluation period for its standard edition; 
however, with the evaluation license the software is only capable of testing a 
test web site provided by AppScan. 
BuyServers Ltd. [63] sells a web vulnerability scanner called Falcove which is 
a 2-in-1 scanning and penetration tool, meaning that it not only tries to detect 
vulnerabilities, but is capable of exploiting them as well. Falcove utilizes a 
crawler feature that checks for web vulnerabilities, audits dynamic content 
(password fields, shopping carts), and generates penetration reports that 
explain the security level of the tested web site. However, BuyServers Ltd. no 
longer supports the trial version of the product that detects SQL injection, 
XSS, and file execution attacks. 
HP’s WebInspect [64] software provides web application security testing and 
assessment for complex web applications. WebInspect claims fast scanning 
capabilities, broad security assessment coverage, and accurate web application 
security scanning results. HP also believes WebInspect identifies security 
vulnerabilities that are undetectable by traditional scanners by using 
innovative assessment technologies such as simultaneous crawl and audit, and 
on current application scanning. HP WebInspect scans for data detection and 
manipulation attacks, session and authentication vulnerabilities, and server 
and general HTTP vulnerabilities, but does not currently provide a working 
evaluation version of the product. 
NT OBJECTives’ NTOSpider [65] is a web application security scanner that 
claims to provide automated vulnerability assessment with unprecedented 
accuracy and comprehensiveness. NTOSpider identifies application 
vulnerabilities and ranks threat priorities, as well as produces graphical 




Sleuth intelligence engine are employed for automation and accuracy, and 
checks vulnerabilities on a case-by-case basis, which provides context-
sensitive vulnerability checking. NTOSpider checks for SQL injection, XSS 
attacks, and session management vulnerabilities, but does not provide a trial 
version for evaluation. 
Table 2.2 provides a summary of the relevant vulnerabilities that each of the 
evaluation versions of the commercial web application scanners detect. 
Vulnerability Type  Hailstorm N-Stalker Netsparker Acunetix Burp Scanner 
SQL Injection X X X X X 
Cross Site Scripting X X X X X 
Session Management X X X X X 
Malicious File Execution - - X X - 
Buffer Overflow - X - X - 
Table 2.2: A comparison of the relevant vulnerabilities detected by evaluation 
versions of commercial web application scanners. 
 














According to Curphey and Araujo [1], there are eight categories of web application 
security Assessment tools: source code analyzers, web application (black box) scanners, 
database scanners, binary analysis tools, runtime analysis tools, configuration 
management tools, HTTP proxies, and miscellaneous tools. The most common of these 
web application assessment tools are source code analyzers and web application scanners. 
Source code analyzers generally achieve good vulnerability detection rates, but are only 
useful if the web application’s source code is available. On the other hand, web 
application vulnerability scanners are the tools which most closely mimic web 
application attacks, but have been known to perform rather poorly [3, 17, 44, 52]. 
There are two main approaches to test web applications for vulnerabilities [5]: 
White box testing: consists of the analysis of the source code of the web 
application. This can be done manually or by using code analysis tools like Ounce 
[6] or Pixy [7]. The problem is that exhaustive source code analysis may be 
difficult and cannot find all security flaws because of the complexity of the code. 
Black box testing: consists in the analyses of the execution of the application in 
search for vulnerabilities. In this approach, also known as penetration testing, the 
scanner does not know the internals of the web application and it uses fuzzing 
techniques over the web HTTP requests.  
In practice, black-box vulnerability scanners are used to discover security problems in 
web applications. These tools operate by launching attacks against an application and 
observing its response to these attacks. To this end, web server vulnerability scanners 
such as Nikto [10] or Nessus [11] dispose of large repositories of known software flaws. 
While these tools are valuable components when auditing the security of a web site, they 
largely lack the ability to identify a priori unknown instances of vulnerabilities. As a 
consequence, there is the need for a scanner that covers a broad range of general classes 
of vulnerabilities, without specific knowledge of bugs in particular versions of web 
applications [9]. 
Security testing a Web application or Web site requires careful thought and planning due 




including analyzing the development environment and process, business needs, and the 
Web application's complexity. M. Curphey and R. Arawo [1] Describes the different 
technology types for analyzing Web applications and Web services for security 
vulnerabilities, along with each type's advantages and disadvantages. Their analysis is 
based on collective experiences and the lessons we've learned along the way. 
Fonseca, J. CISUC proposed a method to evaluate and benchmark automatic web 
vulnerability scanners using software fault injection techniques. The most common types 
of software faults are injected in the web application code which is then checked by the 
scanners. The results are compared by analyzing coverage of vulnerability detection and 
false positives. Three leading commercial scanning tools are evaluated and the results 
show that in general the coverage is low and the percentage of false positives is very high 
[42].  
Fonseca, J. CISUC [4] proposed a methodology to inject realistic attacks 
in Web applications. The methodology is based on the idea that by injecting 
realistic vulnerabilities in a Web application and attacking them automatically we can 
assess existing security mechanisms. To provide true to life results, this methodology 
relies on field studies of a large number of vulnerabilities in Web applications. The paper 
also describes a set of tools implementing the proposed methodology. They allow the 
automation of the entire process, including gathering results and analysis. We used these 
tools to conduct a set of experiments to demonstrate the feasibility and effectiveness of 
the proposed methodology. The experiments include the evaluation of coverage and false 
positives of an intrusion detection system for SQL injection and the assessment of the 
effectiveness of two Web application vulnerability scanners. Results show that the 
injection of vulnerabilities and attacks is an effective way to evaluate security 
mechanisms and tools. 
Stefan Kals, Engin Kirda, Christopher Kruegel, and Nenad Jovanovic [9] developed 
SecuBat, a generic and modular web vulnerability scanner that, similar to a port scanner, 
automatically analyzes web sites with the aim of finding exploitable SQL injection and 




web sites. To verify the accuracy of SecuBat, they picked one hundred interesting web 
sites from the potential victim list for further analysis and confirmed exploitable flaws in 
the identified web pages. Among thier victims were well-known global companies and a 
finance ministry. More than fifty responded to request additional information or to report 
that the security hole was closed. 
SecuBat vulnerability scanner [9] consists of three main components: First, the crawling 
component gathers a set of target web sites. Then, the attack component launches the 
configured attacks against these targets. Finally, the analysis component examines the 
results returned by the web applications to determine whether an attack was successful. 
Scott and Sharp [41] discuss web vulnerabilities such as XSS. They propose to deploy 
application-level firewalls that use manual policies to secure web applications. Their 
approach would certainly protect applications against a vulnerability scanner such as 
SecuBat. However, the problem of their approach is that it is a tedious and error-prone 
task to create suitable policies.  
Huang et al. [13] present a vulnerability detection tool that automatically executes SQL 
injection attacks. As far as SQL injection is concerned, our work is similar to theirs. 
However, their scanner is not as comprehensive as our tool because it lacks any detection 
mechanisms for XSS vulnerabilities where script code is injected into applications. The 
focus of their work, rather, is the detection of application level vulnerabilities that may 
allow the attacker to invoke operating-level system calls (e.g., such as opening a file) for 
malicious purposes. 
There are many commercial web application vulnerability scanners available on the 
market that claim to provide functionality similar to our scanner (e.g., Acunetix Web 
Vulnerability Scanner [8]). Unfortunately, due to the closed-source nature of these 
systems, many of the claims cannot be verified, and an in-depth comparison with our 
scanner is difficult. For example, it appears that the cross-site scripting analysis 
performed by Acunetix is much simpler than the complete attack scenario presented in 




AMNESIA is a model-based technique that combines static analysis and runtime 
monitoring [15, 14]. In its static phase, AMNESIA uses static analysis to build models of 
the different types of queries an application can legally generate at each point of access to 
the database. In its dynamic phase, AMNESIA intercepts all queries before they are sent 
to the database and checks each query against the statically built models. Queries that 
violate the model are identified as SQLIAs and prevented from executing on the 
database. In their evaluation, the authors have shown that this technique performs well 
against SQLIAs. The primary limitation of this technique is that its success is dependent 
on the accuracy of its static analysis for building query models. Certain types of code 
obfuscation or query development techniques could make this step less precise and result 
in both false positives and false negatives. 
SQLGuard [17] and SQLCheck [16] also check queries at runtime to see if they conform 
to a model of expected queries. In these approaches, the model is expressed as a grammar 
that only accepts legal queries. In SQLGuard, the model is deduced at runtime by 
examining the structure of the query before and after the addition of user-input. In 
SQLCheck, the model is specified independently by the developer. Both approaches use a 
secret key to delimit user input during parsing by the runtime checker, so security of the 
approach is dependent on attackers not being able to discover the key. Additionally, the 
use of these two approaches requires the developer to either rewrite code to use a special 
intermediate library or manually insert special markers into the code where user input is  
added to a dynamically generated query. 
WebSSARI detects input-validation related errors using information flow analysis [18]. 
In this approach, static analysis is used to check taint flows against preconditions for 
sensitive functions. The analysis detects the points in which preconditions have not been 
met and can suggest filters and sanitization functions that can be automatically added to 
the application to satisfy these preconditions. The WebSSARI system works by 
considering as sanitized input that has passed through a predefined set of filters. In their 
evaluation, the authors were able to detect security vulnerabilities in a range of existing 
applications. The primary drawbacks of this technique are that it assumes that adequate 




system and that having input passing through certain types of filters is sufficient to 
consider it not tainted. For many types of functions and applications, this assumption is 
too strong. 
Livshits and Lam [19] use static analysis techniques to detect vulnerabilities in software. 
The basic approach is to use information flow techniques to detect when tainted input has 
been used to construct an SQL query. These queries are then flagged as SQLIA 
vulnerabilities. The authors demonstrate the viability of their technique by using this 
approach to find security vulnerabilities in a benchmark suite. The primary limitation of 
this approach is that it can detect only known patterns of SQLIAs and, because it uses a 
conservative analysis and has limited support for untinting operations, can generate a 
relatively high amount of false positives. 
Huang and colleagues [19] propose WAVES, a black-box technique for testing Web 
applications for SQL injection vulnerabilities. The technique uses a Web crawler to 
identify all points in a Web application that can be used to inject SQLIAs. It then builds 
attacks that target such points based on a specified list of patterns and attack techniques. 
WAVES then monitors the application’s response to the attacks and uses machine 
learning techniques to improve its attack methodology. This technique improves over 
most penetration-testing techniques by using machine learning approaches to guide its 
testing. However, like all black-box and penetration testing techniques, it cannot provide 
guarantees of completeness. 
Fu et al. suggested a Static Analysis approach to detect SQL Injection Vulnerabilities. 
The main aim of SAFELI approach is to identify the SQL Injection attacks during 
compile-time. It has a couple of advantages. First, it performs a White-box Static 
Analysis and second, it uses a Hybrid-Constraint Solver. On one hand where the given 
approach considers the byte-code and deals mainly with strings in case of White-box 
Static Analysis, on the other through Hybrid-Constraint Solver, the method implements 
an efficient string analysis tool which is able to deal with Boolean, integer and string 
variables. Its implementation was done on ASP.NET Web applications and it was able to 




approach is an efficient approximation mechanism to deal with string constraints. 
However, the approach is only dedicated to ASP.NET vulnerabilities [25]. 
A secured database testing approach has been suggested for web applications by Haixia 
and Zhihong. This approach suggested the following methodology:-  
I. Detection of potential input points of SQL injection.  
II. Automatic generation of test cases.  
III. Running the test cases to make an attack on the application to find the 
database vulnerability.  
The mechanism suggested here is shown to be efficient as it was able to detect the input 
points of SQL Injection exactly and on time as per expectation. An analysis on this 
technique makes it clear that the approach needs improvement in the development of 
attack rule library and detection capability [26]. 
Ruse et al.’s Approach suggested using automatic test case generation for detection of 
SQL injection vulnerabilities. The idea is to create a specific model that deals with SQL 
queries automatically. Furthermore this technique also identifies the relation between 
sub-queries. This technique is shown to identify the casual set and obtain 85% and 69% 
reduction respectively while experimenting on few sample examples. Moreover, no false 
positive or false negative were produced and it has been able to detect the root cause of 
the injection. Although this approach claimed an apparent efficiency, it has a huge 
drawback that this approach has not been tested on real life existing database with real 
queries [27]. 
Thomas et al.’s approach suggested an automated prepared statement generation 
algorithm to eliminate vulnerabilities related to SQL Injection. Their research work used 
four open source projects namely: (i) Net-trust, (ii) ITrust, (iii) WebGoat, and (iv) Roller. 
The experimental results show that, their prepared statement code was able to 
successfully replace 94% of the SQL injection vulnerabilities in four open source 




Java with a limited number of projects. Hence, the wide application of the same approach 
and tool for different settings still remains an open research issue to investigate [28]. 
SQL-IDS approach has been suggested by Kemalis and Tzouramanis in [29] and it uses a 
novel specification-based methodology for detecting exploitations of SQL injection 
vulnerabilities. The method proposed here does query-specific detection which allows the 
system to perform concentrated analysis at almost no computational overhead. It also 
does not produce any false positives or false negatives. This is a very new approach and 
in practice it’s very efficient; however, it is required to conduct more experiments and do 
comparison with other detection methods under a flexible and shared environment. 
McClure and Krüger suggested a framework SQL DOM (strongly-typed set of classes 
with database schema). The existing flaws have been considered closely during access of 
relational databases from Object-Oriented Programming Language’s point of view. The 
focus lies mainly in identifying hurdles in interacting with databases through Call Level 
Interfaces. The solution proposed here is based on SQL DOM object model to handle this 
kind of issues by creating a secure surrounding i.e., creation of SQL statement through 
object manipulation for communication. When this technique was evaluated qualitatively 
it showed many advantages for: testability, readability, maintainability and error 
detection at compile. Although this proposal is efficient, there still exists scope of further 
improvements with latest and more advanced tools such as CodeSmith [30]. 
Ali et al.’s approach has been adopted by Ali et al. in which a hash value technique has 
been followed to improve user authentication mechanism. Hash values for user name and 
password has been used. For testing this kind of framework SQLIPA (SQL Injection 
Protector for Authentication) was developed. Hash values for user name and password is 
created for the first time user account is created and they stored in the user account table 
in a database. The framework requires further improvement in order to minimize the 
overhead time which was 1.3 ms even though tested on few sample data. Hence simply 
minimizing the overhead time is not sufficient but also to test this framework with large 




Su and Wassermann implemented their algorithm with SQLCHECK on a real time 
environment. It checks whether the input queries conform to the expected ones defined 
by the programmer. A secret key is applied for the user input delimitation. The analysis 
of SQLCHECK shows no false positives or false negatives. Also, the overhead runtime 
rate is very low and can be implemented directly in many other Web applications using 
different languages. Table 3 shows the number of attacks attempted as well as prevented 
[32]. It also shows the number of valid uses attempted and allowed, and the mean and 
standard deviation of times across all runs of SQLCHECK for the application under 
check. It is a very efficient approach; however, once an attacker discovers the key, it 
becomes vulnerable. Furthermore, it also needs to be tested with online Web applications 
[32, 33]. 
Dynamic Candidate Evaluations approach has been proposed by Bisht et al. called 
CANDID (Candidate evaluation for Discovering Intent Dynamically). It is a Dynamic 
Candidate Evaluations technique in which SQL injection is not only detected but also 
prevented automatically. Mechanism behind this method is that it dynamically extracts 
the query structures from every SQL query location which is intended by the developer. 
So, basically it resolves the problem of manually changing the application to produce the 
prepared statements. Although tool using this mechanism has been shown to be efficient 
in some cases, it failed for many other cases. An example for its failure is when applied at 
a wrong level or when an external function is dealt with. Furthermore it also fails in many 
cases due to limited capability of this technique [34]. 
Cross Site Scripting (XSS) vulnerability analysis has many approaches [20], Interpreter-
based Approaches and Syntactical Structure Analysis. Pietraszek, and Berghe use 
Interpreter based approach of instrumenting interpreter to track untrusted data at the 
character level and to identify vulnerabilities they use context-sensitive string evaluation 
at each susceptible sink [21]. This approach is sound and can detect vulnerabilities as 
they add security assurance by modifying the interpreter. But approach of modifying 
interpreter is not easily applicable to some other web programming languages, such as 




On the other hand, A successful inject attack changes the syntactical structure of the 
exploited entity, stated by Su, and Wassermann in [22] and they present an approach to 
check the syntactic structure of output string to detect malicious payload. Augment the 
user input with metadata to track this sub-string from source to sinks. This metadata help 
the modified parser to check the syntactical structure of the dynamically generated string 
by indicating end and start position of the user given data. If there is any abnormality 
then it blocks further process. These processes are quite success while it detect any 
injection vulnerabilities other than XSS. Only checking the syntactic structure is not 
sufficient to prevent this sort of workflow vulnerabilities that are caused by the 
interaction of multiple modules [23]. 
Gary and Zhendong [24] presented a static analysis for finding XSS vulnerabilities that 
directly addresses weak or absent input validation. thier approach combines work on 
tainted information flow with string analysis. Proper input validation is difficult largely 
because of the many ways to invoke the JavaScript interpreter; they faced the same 
obstacle checking for vulnerabilities statically, and they address it by formalizing a policy 
based on the W3C recommendation, the Firefox source code, and online tutorials about 
closed-source browsers. They provide effective checking algorithms based on thier 
policy. And they implemented their approach and provided an extensive evaluation that 
finds both known and unknown vulnerabilities in real-world web applications. 
A number of black-box testing, fault injection and behavior monitoring to web 
applications approaches has been used by Y. Huang, S. Huang, Lin, and Tsai in order to 
predict the presence of vulnerabilities [35]. This approach combines user experience 
modeling as black-box testing and user-behavior simulation [36]. There are many other 
projects where a similar kind of approach has been followed like APPScan [37], 
WebInspect[38], and ScanDo [39]. As all these approaches were used to detect errors in 
the development life cycle, they might not be able to provide instant web application 
protection [40] and they cannot guarantee the detection of all flaws as well [41]. 
Su and Wassermann in [32] suggested an approach which states that when there is a 




entity. So, they have presented an approach where syntactic structure of output string is 
checked to detect malicious payload. For tracking sub-string from source to sinks they 
increased the user input with metadata. The modified parser was helped by this metadata 
to check the syntactical structure of the dynamically generated string by indicating start 
and end point of the user given input. Moreover the process was blocked if there was a 
sign of any abnormality. This approach was found to be quite successful while it detects 
any injection vulnerabilities other than XSS. Hence, it is not sufficient to avoid this sort 
of workflow vulnerabilities which are result of interaction between multiple modules 
[43]. 
Interpreter-based approach has been suggested by Pietraszek, and Berghe in which there 
is use of instrumenting interpreter to track untrusted data at the character level and for 
identifying vulnerabilities that use context-sensitive string evaluation at each susceptible 
sink [44]. This technique is good and also able to detect vulnerabilities as security 
assurance is added by modifying the interpreter, however this approach of modifying 
interpreter is not easily feasible to some other famous and widely used web programming 


















Many scanners which are considered as web application scanners 
identify vulnerabilities that are known in specific pages and applications. For 
example, the Content Management Systems (CMS), such as Joomla and 
wordpress, have many vulnerabilities for with web scanners contains a 
signature for it, but these scanners don’t have signatures for vulnerabilities 
that may present in a custom web application built for specific client. In order 
to detect and examine these custom vulnerabilities, the web scanner have to 
dynamically generate test requests that are applied to the given web 
application. 
In order to start analyzing vulnerabilities of the web application, the 
scanner need to get data from the web application, these data will be the GET 
and POST requests with parameters. Getting data from web application is 
called crawling; this is very effective technique that can be used to record web 
application pages parameters and requests. 
Our approach performs tests for two major web applications 
vulnerabilities, which are, SQL Injection and Cross Site Scripting (XSS). The 
main reason for choosing these vulnerabilities is their criticality and 
importance, as they were reported by OWASP as the most vulnerability of 
web applications [47]. 
4.2 Tools used 
To implement the vulnerability analysis scanner many tools were used. 
This includes, Perl Programming Language, Linux OS: BackTrack 5, and 







4.2.2 Perl Programming Language 
Perl Programming language was originally developed by Larry Wall in 
1987 as a general-purpose Unix scripting language to make report processing 
easier. Since then, it has undergone many changes and revisions. The latest 
major stable revision is 5.16, released in May 2012. Perl borrows features 
from other programming languages including C, shell scripting (sh), AWK, 
and sed. The language provides powerful text processing facilities without the 
arbitrary data length limits of many contemporary UNIX tools, facilitating 
easy manipulation of text files. Perl gained widespread popularity in the late 
1990s as a CGI scripting language, in part due to its parsing abilities. In 
addition to CGI, Perl is used for graphics programming, system 
administration, network programming, finance, bioinformatics, and other 
applications [66]. 
Perl has many features since The overall structure of Perl derives 
broadly from C. Perl is procedural in nature, 
with variables, expressions, assignment statements, brace-
delimited blocks, control structures, and subroutines. Perl also takes features 
from shell programming. All variables are marked with leading sigils, which 
unambiguously identify the data type (for example, scalar, array, hash) of the 
variable in context. Importantly, sigils allow variables to be interpolated 
directly into strings. Perl has many built-in functions that provide tools often 
used in shell programming (although many of these tools are implemented by 
programs external to the shell) such as sorting, and calling on system facilities 
[66]. 
Perl is often used as a glue language, tying together systems and 
interfaces that were not specifically designed to interoperate, and for "data 
munging",[66] that is, converting or processing large amounts of data for tasks 
such as creating reports. In fact, these strengths are intimately linked. The 




administrators, particularly because short programs can be entered and run on 
a single command line. 
Perl code can be made portable across Windows and Unix; such code 
is often used by suppliers of software (both COTS and bespoke) to simplify 
packaging and maintenance of software build- and deployment-scripts. 
4.2.3 Linux Operating System (Backtrack Distribution) 
BackTrack Distribution is a penetration testing and security auditing 
platform with advanced tools to identify, detect, and exploit any 
vulnerabilities uncovered in the target network environment. Applying 
appropriate testing methodology with defined business objectives and a 
scheduled test plan will result in robust penetration testing of your network. 
BackTrack is a merger between three different live Linux penetration 
testing distributions—IWHAX, WHOPPIX, and Auditor. In its current 
version, BackTrack is based on Ubuntu Linux distribution version. 
BackTrack contains a number of tools that can be used during your 
penetration testing process. The penetration testing tools included in 
Backtrack can be categorized into the following: 
- Information gathering: This category contains several tools that 
can be used to get information regarding a target DNS, routing, e-mail 
address, websites, mail server, and so on. This information is gathered from 
the available information on the Internet, without touching the target 
environment. 
- Network mapping: This category contains tools that can be used 
to check the live host, fingerprint operating system, application used by the 
target, and also do port scanning. 
- Vulnerability identification: In this category we can find tools to 




carry out fuzzing and analyze Server Message Block (SMB) and Simple 
Network Management Protocol (SNMP). 
- Web application analysis: This category contains tools that can 
be used in auditing web application. 
- Radio network analysis: To audit wireless networks, Bluetooth 
and Radio Frequency Identifier (RFID), you can use the tools in this category. 
- Penetration: This category contains tools that can be used to 
exploit the vulnerabilities found in the target machine. 
- Privilege escalation: After exploiting the vulnerabilities and 
gaining access to the target machine, we can use tools in this category to 
escalate privilege to the highest privilege. 
- Maintaining access: Tools in this category will be able to help us 
in maintaining access to the target machine.  
- Voice over IP (VOIP): To analyze VOIP we can utilize the tools 
in this category. 
- Digital forensics: In this category we can find several tools that can be 
used to do digital forensics such as acquiring hard disk image, carving 
files, and analyzing hard disk image.  
- Reverse engineering: This category contains tools that can be used to 
debug a program or disassemble an executable file. 
4.3  Development Description 
 
In this section, our approach details will be described. The main steps of our 
approach are described in figure 4.1. First, the scanner will do manual 
crawling for the web application pages. Second, it will loop through all log 
requests that were recorded by the crawler and filter these requests as they are 
GET or POST requests, in this steps the scanner will check for requests 
parameters as well. Third, for each parameter of each request the scanner will 
perform our main tests which are SQL INJECTION and XSS tests. Fourth, the 




found the scanner will check for HTTP PUT test. The scanner reports each 
transaction of the done tests so it will generate a full report at the end of work 
 
The approach steps can be listed as followed order: 
1. Web application crawling. 
2. Web pages requests with parameters filtering. 
3. SQL Injection test. 
4. Cross Site Scripting (XSS) test. 
5. Directory listing test. 
6. Report Generation. 
4.3.1 Web application crawling 
 
The first step that the scanner will do is obtaining data about the target web 
application. This process will be called Application crawling. This is very 
effective technique that can be used to record web application pages 
parameters and requests. 
 
Web Scanner can use web crawling in two ways, automatic web crawling and 
manual web crawling. Firstly, Automatic crawling software is a type of bot; In 
general, it starts with a list of URLs to visit, called the seeds. As the crawler 
visits these URLs, it identifies all the hyperlinks in the page and adds them to 
the list of URLs to visit, called the crawl frontier. URLs from the frontier 
are recursively visited according to a set of policies. Examples of these 
crawlers are: GNU Wget utility, Aspseek, GRUB. Secondly, Manual crawling 
which can be done using a local web proxy with manually accepting and 
recording web requests. The main benefit of both techniques is to build a list 
of web requests for all web application pages and links so they can be passed 




Figure 4.1: Our approach flowchart 
 
Even the automatic web crawling is easier and faster, it can’t discover all 
application pages for many reasons. Firstly, the crawling software must be 
able to parse Web forms and generate logical form submissions to the 
application (i.e. web crawler couldn’t submit form with reCAPTCHA field). 
Otherwise, the application's business logic prevents the user from reaching 
subsequent pages or areas of the application. Secondly, automated web 




presents, they might cause unanticipated events to occur. For example, if a 
hyperlink presented to the user allows certain transactions to be processed or 
initiated, the agent might inadvertently delete or modify application data or 
initiate unanticipated transactions on behalf of a user. For these reasons, most 
experienced testers normally prefer the manual crawling technique because it 
allows them to achieve a thorough crawl of the application while maintaining 
control over the data and pages that are requested during the crawl and 
ultimately are used to generate test requests [9]. 
Our approach will rely on a manual application crawl to discover all testable 
pages and requests. In order to complete this task, we will use local proxy 
server utility to record all application requests in a log file as manually to 
crawl the application. 
4.3.2 Web pages requests with parameters filtering 
 
Our scanner works on HTTP (GET, POST) requests and response parameters. 
HTTP works through a series of requests from the client and associated server 
responses back to the client. Each request is independent and results in a 
server response. A typical raw HTTP request is shown in figure 4.2. 
  
 
Figure 4.2: RAW HTTP request 
  
Our scanner depends on GET and POST methods, in GET method the request 
can contain parameters that will be send with the HTTP request. A typical 




multiple parameter data separated by & mark. Our scanner will parse and use 
each one of the parameters to check its vulnerability tests. 
 
 
Figure 4.3: GET method 
 
The POST method passes the data parameters of the request after all request 
headers, as show in figure 4.4. as well as, our scanner will parse these 
parameters in order to use it in the vulnerability test. 
 
Figure 4.4: POST method 
 
The scanner will parse all HTTP requests and generate a new list containing 
only the type of request (GET, POST), the path of the web page requested, 
and the passed parameters of the request. Figure 4.5 shows a sample list 
generated by the scanner. 
 
 




4.3.3 SQL Injection  
 
SQL injection can be present in any front-end application accepting data entry 
from a system or user, which is then used to access a database server. In this 
section, we will focus on our techniques in identifying and testing of SQL 
injection vulnerabilities. 
In a Web environment, the Web browser is a client acting as a front end 
requesting data from the user and sending it to the remote server which will 
create SQL queries using the submitted data. Our main goal at this stage is to 
identify anomalies in the server response and determine whether they are 
generated by SQL injection vulnerability. 
Our two main techniques for testing SQL Injection vulnerabilities are testing 
by inference (parameter based) and UNION-Blind injection, figure 4.6 

























1- SQL Injection by inference: 
Testing for SQL Injection by inference requires three steps: 
a. Identify all the data entry on the Web application. 
b. Specify the kind of request that might trigger anomalies. 
c. Detect anomalies in the response from the server. 
Once our scanner identified all the data accepted by the application, it will 
modify it and analyze the response from the server. If the web application 
is vulnerable its response will include an SQL error that reported directly 
from the database server. 
 
 
Figure 4.7: Database server error response 
Figure 4.7 illustrates the scenario of a request from the scanner which 
triggers an error on the database. Depending on how the application is 
coded, the file returned in step 4 will be constructed and handled as a 
result of one of the following: 
a. The SQL error is displayed on the page and is visible to the user 
from the Web browser. 
b. The SQL error is hidden in the source of the Web page for 
debugging purposes. 
c. Redirection to another page is used when an error is detected. 
d. An HTTP error code 500 (Internal Server Error) or HTTP 




e. The application handles the error properly and simply shows no 
results, perhaps displaying a generic error page. 
 
In order to identify the SQL injection vulnerability the scanner needs to 
determine the type of response the application is returning. These 
responses are categorized into two types, Common database server errors 
and Generic error. 
Common database servers errors are known as full SQL error and even 
they are different from database server to another it’s the easiest way to 
determine if the parameters are vulnerability hole to the web application, 
Table 4.1 represent different error response messages from database 
servers. The scanner will check for error messages returned and search for 
common errors in the return error message. 
No. Database Server Error Message 
1. SQL Server Server Error in '/' Application. 
Syntax error converting the nvarchar value 
'Microsoft SQL Server 2000 – 8.00.760 (Intel X86) 
Dec 17 2002 14:22:05 Copyright (c) 1988-2003 
Microsoft Corporation Enterprise Edition on 
Windows NT 5.2 (Build 3790: ) ' to a column of 
data type int. 
Description: An unhandled exception occurred 
during the execution of the current web request. 
Please review the stack trace for more information 
about the error and where it originated in the code. 
2. MySQL Server Error: You have an error in your SQL syntax; 
check the manual that corresponds to your MySQL 
server version for the right syntax to use near 
''' at line 1 




OleDbException: One or more errors occurred 
during processing of command. 
ORA-00933: SQL command not properly ended 
Table 4.1: Common database servers’ errors. 
Generic errors returns from web application server are second kind of 
errors returned from database server that will be tested by our scanner; 
these generic errors are returned instead of known error messages 
described in table 4.2 and they may indicate a potential SQL injection 
vulnerability. In order to test for generic errors the scanner will inject SQL 
code into parameter and analyses server response which will be in many 
various forms. These forms categorized into two types, HTTP Code Error 
and Different Response size error as in Table 4.2. 
Error Type Error Criteria 
500 server error 500 status codes returned in the test response, 
but not in the original page response. 
Generic error message Generic error message (string 
including unable to, error, or cannot) returned 
in the test response, but not in the original 
page response. 
Small (length) response Test response was 100 characters or less in 
length, and the original page response was 
greater than 100 characters in length. 
Detailed database error Database error message detected in the test 
response, but not in the original page 
response. 
No error None of the error classification criteria were 
met. 





2- OR Injection test: 
OR 1=1 Injection test is used to determine whether there are additional 
injection testing can be performed using the current parameter and its 
associated request. In this stage we exploit the SQL code and check if it 
can be exploited in order to complete our tests. 
Since each query has different coding criteria we have to automate this 
exploit, this function inserts several different OR 1=1 test strings in an 
attempt to make the application execute a well-formed query. The 
generated response from the server will be tested for successful reply so 
this will confirm the success of OR test. 
The following expression used by our function to complete this exploit 
test: 
  "1%20OR%20'1'%3D'1'--", 
  "1'%20OR%201%3D1--", 
  "1\)%20OR%20'1'%3D'1'--", 
  "1'\)%20OR%201%3D1--", 
  "1\)\)%20OR%20'1'%3D'1'--", 
  "1'\)\)%20OR%201%3D1--", 
  "1\)\)\)%20OR%20'1'%3D'1'--", 
  "1'\)\)\)%20OR%201%3D1--", 
  "%20OR%20'1'%3D'1'--", 
  "'%20OR%201%3D1--", 
  "1'%20OR%20'1'%3D'1", 
  "1'%20OR%201%3D1", 
  "1%20OR%20'1'%3D'1'", 
  "1'\)%20OR%20\('1'%3D'1", 




  "1\)%20OR%20\('1'%3D'1'", 
  "1'\)\)%20OR%20\(\('1'%3D'1", 
  "1'\)\)%20OR%20\(\(1%3D1", 
  "1\)\)%20OROR%20\(\('1'%3D'1'", 
  "1'\)\)\)%20OR%20\(\(\('1'%3D'1", 
  "1'\)\)\)%20OR%20\(\(\(1%3D1", 
  "1\)\)\)%20OR%20\(\(\('1'%3D'1'" 
After making the request to the target server, we check for successful 
reply and by gaining this reply we confirm that the server is vulnerable for 
applying next tests. 
3- UNION-Blind Injection: 
If the web application does not respond with error messages from database 
server and only respond with developer messages, then SQL injection by 
inference can’t be used and our scanner will attempt to blind injection 
technique if only we have successfully exploited the server with the OR 
test. Blind SQL injection is a type of SQL injection vulnerability where 
the attacker can manipulate an SQL statement and the application returns 
different values for true and false conditions [book: sql inj]. 
Our UNION-Blind technique is a merged technique of UNION based 
injection technique and BLIND injection technique. Our proposed method 
starts with detecting the database server type since each database server 
has its own SQL syntax. Secondly, the method starts the BLIND injection 
in order to determine the number of columns in the target query as well as 
to determine the columns data types in that query. Thirdly, In case our 
BLIND technique failed, the UNION technique will start to determine the 
number of columns in the target query as well as to determine the columns 




In order to start BLIND column count of the target query we have to use 
ORDER BY statement. By appending the ORDER BY followed by the 
column number into our last stage injection result (OR test) we can count 
the number of columns found in the query. By incrementing the ORDER 
BY counter value, we will count the columns until we reach an error 
response from the server. 
After we have determined the number of columns in the target query, we 
have to determine the data type of each column. This procedure is 
database specific, so we first have to determine the type of our target 
database server.  
In order to determine the target database server, we have to test for private 
information that distinct database servers from each other. This 
information can be a default table name that differs from database server 
to other, and list of common data types names that also differ in name 
from database server to other. As an example, ORACLE database server 
use a default table name (ALL_TABLES) table and a common data types 
names (CHAR, NUMBER, and DATE). On the other side, MSSQL 
database server use a default table name (master.sysdatabases) table and a 
common data types names (VARCHAR, INT). 
After determining the database server type, we can start our BLIND 
columns data type test. This test will be done for each column in the target 
query. In order to determine the data type, we iterate through columns 
positions in the target query and for each column we loop through a 
known data type list until we get a response from the server with no error 
reply.  
In case our BLIND Injection test failed the scanner will start the UNION 
injection test immediately. UNION Injection is based on return error 
messages from the server. These error messages are specific for each 




methods, and for each method there are specific error message the scanner 
will search for, table 4.3 list each error message for database servers.  
Database 
server 




Invalid table in 
UNION 
Invalid object name. 
Incorrect number 
of columns in 
UNION 
All queries in an SQL statement containing a UNION 
operator must have an equal number of expressions in their 
target lists. 
Incorrect data 
type in UNION 
(three possible 
messages) 
Error converting data type nvarchar to float or Syntax error 
converting the nvarchar value '' to a column of data type 
into Operand type clash 
MySQL 
Server 
Invalid table in 
UNION 
SQLSTATE: 42S02 (ER_BAD_TABLE_ERROR) 
Unknown table '%s' 
Incorrect number 




The used SELECT statements have a different number of 
columns 
Incorrect data 
type in UNION 
(three possible 
messages) 
incorrect date time value in column 
incorrect string value in column 
incorrect integer value in column 




Table or view does not exist or Invalid table name 
Incorrect number 
of columns in 
UNION 
Query block has incorrect number of result columns. 
Incorrect data 
type in UNION 
Expression must have same data type as corresponding 
expression. 
Table 4.3: MySQL, Microsoft SQL Server, and Oracle error messages 
First UNION injection test module is to determine if UNION injection is 
possible for the current target query, this is done by attempting to run a 
UNION query against a nonexistent table and checks to see if its specific 
error message is returned. This error message is also used to determine the 
type of database server we are exploiting because the error messages differ 




Second UNION injection test module is to determine whether the UNION 
query contains the correct number of columns. Once we attempt to query a 
valid table within the UNION query, the database should respond with an 
error indicating that our query must have the same number of columns as 
the original query. We attempt to brute-force the number of columns in the 
original query by continuing to add columns to the UNION query until this 
error goes away. 
Third UNION injection test module is to determine the appropriate data 
type in each column position. Once we have the right number of columns 
in our UNION query, the database server should return an error indicating 
that the data types in each column must match those in the original query. 
Our scanner precedes to brute-force the correct data type combination by 
attempting every possible combination of data types within the allotted 
number of columns. 
At the end, our scanner will report its success or fail results in the current 
query request for the whole SQL injection test modules and continue 
testing for the XSS vulnerability. 
4.3.4 Cross Site Scripting (XSS) 
 
Analyzing cross-site scripting (XSS) vulnerabilities can be a complex and 
time consuming task. To speed up the location of XSS vulnerabilities, we 
inject a test string containing JavaScript code into every HTTP parameter 
request done by our scanner, and then the scanner checks if the injected 
string is returned in the HTTP response. 
Our scanner tests for XSS vulnerabilities in 2 ways. Simple java script 
alert message test request, and encoded java script alert message test 





In simple java script alert message, the scanner simply injects a java script 
alert message and reads the reply message from the request, if this reply 
was the same as the injected alert message then this page request with its 
parameter is marked as vulnerable. The simple alert message is 
―<script>alert("XSS")</script>‖. 
In encoded java script alert message request, the scanner encodes the 
request and reads the reply message from the request, if this reply was the 
same as the injected alert message then this page request with its 
parameter is marked as vulnerable. There are two reasons for encoding the 
injected alert message. A first reason is to Avoid the Intrusion Detection 
System (IDS). A Second one is to bypass any filtering mechanism engines 
that may filter the normal java script code in the URL request. The 
encoded alert messages are divided into normal encoded messages and 
fully encoded messages. These messages are as follow: 










































































In this chapter we validate the proposed Vulnerability Scanner. In order to do 
that we developed experiments to measure the performance of our scanner and 
used some performance metrics to measure the performance of it. The 
performance metrics used are: 
- Accuracy: Accuracy measures the rate of generating correct results. If 
there are N vulnerabilities being monitored by the scanner and there are x 
of these vulnerabilities for which the scanner predicts correctly if the 
path of these packets is hacked or not then:  
Accuracy (%) = (x/N)*100% 
Accuracy is also defined as the number of vulnerabilities detected by the 
system (True Positive) divided by the total number of vulnerabilities 
present in the test set. 
- False positive rate: This is the rate at which the scanner states that the 
HTTP request has vulnerability while in fact the HTTP request has no 
vulnerability. If the scanner tests N HTTP request for possible 
vulnerabilities. In addition, the scanner detects N1 positive 
vulnerabilities that N1 have vulnerabilities out of N HTTP requests. If x 
of these N1 are false, then: 
False positive rate (%) = (x/N1)*100 % 
 
- False negative rate: This is the rate at which the scanner dose not 
detects vulnerability while in fact the HTTP request has vulnerability. If 
the scanner test N URL request for possible vulnerabilities. In addition, 
the scanner detects N1 negative vulnerabilities that N1 requests have 
vulnerabilities out of N HTTP requests. If x of these N1 requests are 
false, then: 





In order to validate our scanner we compare the performance results of it with 
performance of similar tools in the literature. The comparison shows how our 
scanner performs compared to other similar tools. 
To test our scanner, we used developed test beds. These test beds are common 
vulnerable web applications that are built by security developers and tested by 
nature for web penetration testing and hacking. These vulnerable web 
applications support to be installed and configured under multiple web servers 
and multiple database servers. The vulnerabilities on these web applications are 
known so we can apply our accuracy, false negative and false positive metrics as 
required. 
5.2 Test Beds Description 
 
This section describes the used test beds to test our scanner. These test beds 
are built in PHP and can be configured with multiple database servers. 
1- DVWA (Dam Vulnerable Web Application) [74]- this vulnerable 
PHP/MySQL web application is one of the famous web applications 
used for or testing your skills in web penetration testing and your 
knowledge in manual SQL Injection, XSS, Blind SQL Injection, etc. 
DVWA is developed by Ryan Dewhurst a.k.a ethicalhack3r and is part 
of RandomStorm Open Source project. Figure 5.1 shows the main page 
of the application. 
2- Mutillidae [75]- is a free and open source web application for website 
penetration testing and hacking which was developed by Adrian 
―Irongeek‖ Crenshaw and Jeremy ―webpwnized‖ Druin. It is designed to 
be exploitable and vulnerable and ideal for practicing your Web Fu 
skills like SQL injection, cross site scripting, HTML injection, 
Javascript injection, clickjacking, local file inclusion, authentication 
bypass methods, remote code execution and many more based on 
OWASP (Open Web Application Security) Top 10 Web Vulnerabilities. 





Figure 5.1: Dam vulnerable web application 
 
Figure 5.2: Mutillidae vulnerable web application 
3- OWASP InsecureWebApp - is a web application that includes 
common web application vulnerabilities. It is a target for automated and 
manual penetration testing, source code analysis, vulnerability 




4- Web Security Dojo [76] – is a free open-source self-contained training 
environment for Web Application Security penetration testing that 
includes tools and vulnerable web applications targets. Some of included 
vulnerable targets are OWASP’s WebGoat, Google’s Gruyere, Damn 
Vulnerable Web App, Hacme Casino, OWASP InsecureWebApp, and 
w3af’s test website. 
 
5.3 Results of our scanner with test beds 
 
In this section we discuss and describe the output results of our scanner for 
the selected test beds. Choosing only four test beds for out tests and analysis 
was sufficient enough because the selected test beds covers all possible 
vulnerabilities implemented in the insecure version of any web application. 
 
In order to start our tests we have configured the web server and 
implemented all test beds with their default configurations. This insures that 
all implemented vulnerabilities are available for test and no changes on the 
database parameters and data were changed. 
 
Second step of testing procedure is to crawl our vulnerable web applications 
with our described method in section 4.3. The result of this step will be a list 
of all HTTP requests in one log file for each vulnerable web application. 
 
Thirdly, we have started our vulnerability scanner with each log file and 
started to get report and results for analysis. After each successful test, the 
scanner results were reviewed to determine which vulnerabilities and what 
kind of each vulnerability was detected. 
Results were classified as false-negatives or false-positives by following the 
classification procedure described in section 5.1. 
The results obtained from the tests that targeted the test beds for SQL 














Test bed 1 Test bed 2 Test bed 3 Test bed 4
No. of Detected Vulnerabilities
No. of known Vulnerabilities
False Negative
False Positive
 No. of Detected 
Vulnerabilities 






Test bed 1 18 20 2 1 
Test bed 2 34 35 1 2 
Test bed 3 36 40 4 1 
Test bed 4 15 15 0 1 
Total 103 (93.6%) 110 7 (6.4%) 5 (4.8%) 
Table 5.1: SQL injection Results 
 
As shown in Table 5.1, our scanner detected 103 SQL injection 
vulnerabilities out of 110 known implemented vulnerabilities, so the 
corresponding false negative is only 7 vulnerabilities. As well as, the false 
positive vulnerabilities of the detected ones were only 5. The overall 
detection rate was 93.6 % and the corresponding false negative rate was 6.4 
% and the false positive rate was 4.8 %. Figure 5.3 represents the graph of 
the corresponding result. 
 
 
Figure 5.3: SQL injection Results Graph 
The results obtained from the tests that targeted the test beds for Cross Site 















Test bed 1 Test bed 2 Test bed 3 Test bed 4
No. of Detected
Vulnerabilities
No. of known Vulnerabilities
False Negative
False Positive
 No. of Detected 
Vulnerabilities 






Test bed 1 33 35 2 1 
Test bed 2 24 25 1 1 
Test bed 3 44 45 1 2 
Test bed 4 18 20 2 1 
Total 119 (95.2%) 125 6 (4.8%) 5 (4.2%) 
Table 5.2: Cross Site Scripting (XSS) Results 
 
As shown in Table 5.2, our scanner detected 119 XSS vulnerabilities out of 
125 known implemented vulnerabilities, so the corresponding false negative 
is only 6 vulnerabilities. As well as, the false positive vulnerabilities of the 
detected ones were only 5. The overall detection rate was 95.2 % and the 
corresponding false negative rate was 4.8 % and the false positive rate was 
4.2 %. Figure 5.4 represents the graph of the corresponding result. 
 






5.4 Other Web applications vulnerability scanners 
 
In this section we describe the other web applications vulnerability scanners 
used to compare results with our scanner. These scanners vary from 
commercial to open source vulnerability scanners. As well as, these 
scanners supports different criteria as some of them has SQL Injection and 
XSS scanning ability. 
1- Acunetix web vulnerability scanner:   
Acunetix scanner [8] divides type of scanning according to the severity 
of the type of web attack. It divides in four type’s high, medium, low and 
informational severity. Acunetix is used to detect various types of web 
vulnerabilities as below. 
i)  SQL injection.  
ii)  Cross site scripting. 
iii)  CGI scripting. 
iv)  Firewalls and SSL. 
v)  URL redirection. 
SQL  injection  and Cross  site  scripting  scans  are  comes under  the 
high  severity  type as they  are  considered  most  dangerous  attacks  in  
the  web  security.  Other attacks are categorized according to their 
severity on the web services.   
Although this scanner does little bit extra amount of scanning, it is very 
slow as compare to the other tool available in market and slower than our 
scanner as well.   
2- SQLmap: 
Sqlmap [77] is an SQL injection scanner build in Python. The aim of  
this  tool  is  to detect SQL injection  vulnerabilities  and  take  advantage 
of these vulnerabilities  on  web application. Sqlmap  initially  detect  the  
whole loop in  the target site and then use variety  of option  to  perform  
extensive  back-end  database  management,  enumerate  users,  dump 




specific file on the file system etc. SQLmap is bit faster than acunetix 
web scanner but still slower than our scanner, and it also make very few 
URL injection in to the database as compare to our scanner. 
3- Wapiti: 
Wapiti [78] is command line based tool build in python and uses a 
Python library called lswww. This  is  the  spider  library  helps  to  crawl  
each  page  on  given web  site. Wapiti allows us to inspect the security 
of our web site. This tool also used html Tidy lib to clean the html pages 
which are not well formatted.  This library helps a lot to extract 
information from bad-coded html web pages. Basically it does black-box 
scan. Wapiti scans the all Web Pages available on the web site and try to 
find out scripts and form where it can inject data to check how many 
types of attack are possible on selected injection point.  
Wapiti can detect SQL injection and XSS (Cross Site Scripting) 
injection. Wapiti has one of  the  best  features  that  it’s  able  to  
differentiate  temporary  and  permanent  XSS vulnerabilities. 
4- Paros: 
Paros [12] is used for web application security assessment.  Paros  is 
written  in  Java,  and people  generally  used  this  tool  to  evaluate  the  
security  of  their  web  sites  and  the applications that they provide on 
web site. It is free of charge, and using Paros’s you can exploit and 
modified all HTTP and HTTPS data among client and server along with 
form fields and cookies. In brief the functionality of scanner is as below.  
According  to web  site  hierarchy  server  get  scan,  it  checks  for  
server misconfiguration. They  add  this  feature  because  some URL  
paths  can’t  be  recognized  and  found  by  the crawler.  The other 
automatic scanners are not able to do that.  Basically to work this 
functionality Paros navigates the site and rebuilds the website hierarchy. 
Presently Paros does three types of server configuration checks.  HTTP 




file, which is create when all the HTTP request and reply pass through 
Paros. In log panel Paros shows back as request and reply format. 
5- Pixy: 
Pixy [2] is the second tool that is written in Java. Pixy  does automatic  
scans  for  PHP  4  for  the  detection  for  SQL  injection  and XSS  
attacks.  The major disadvantage of Pixy is that it only works for PHP 4 
and not for OOPHP 5. Pixy take whole PHP file as an input and produce 
a report that shows the possible vulnerability section in that PHP file 
along with some additional information to understand attack.  
While SQL injection analysis Pixy divides result in three categories: 
untainted, weakly tainted, and strongly tainted. It also provide 
dependence graph and dependence value. Dependent  value  is  nothing  
but  the  list  of  points  in  program  on  which  the  value  of variables is 
depends.   
5.5 Performance evaluation of our scanner with other 
vulnerability scanners 
 
This section states and describes the comparison in performance and 
accuracy between our scanner and the other web vulnerability scanners 
described in the above section. 
The comparison between scanners has two criteria. First, features 
comparisons which are the supported database systems, development 
language, and attack types in each scanner. Second, the time required by 
each scanner to complete its vulnerability scan test on known number of 
vulnerabilities and the total number of detected vulnerabilities of these 
known ones. 
1- Features comparisons: 















ORACLE, MS SQL 
Server, MySQL 
Perl SQLi, XSS 
Acunetix 
ORACLE, MS SQL 
Server, MySQL, PSQL, 
MS Access 
- 5 (section 5.4) 
SQLmap 
ORACLE, MS SQL 
Server, MySQL, PSQL 
Python 3 (section 5.4) 
Wapiti 
ORACLE, MS SQL 
Server, MySQL 
Python SQLi, XSS 
Paros 
ORACLE, MS SQL 
Server, MySQL 
Java SQLi, XSS 
Pixy 
ORACLE, MS SQL 
Server, MySQL 
Java SQLi, XSS 
Table 5.3: Features comparison between vulnerability scanners. 
2- Performance test: 
In order to test the time performance between the vulnerability scanners, 
we have tested these scanners on known number of vulnerabilities in 
vulnerable web application. The number of vulnerabilities was 100 
vulnerability that are SQL injection and Cross Site Scripting 
vulnerabilities.  
In this test, we have counted the number of detected vulnerabilities for 
each scanner from these known vulnerabilities in order to calculate its 
accuracy in vulnerability detection. Table 5.4 describes this measure 







































Our scanner 100 SQLi, XSS 2m 20sec 95 
Acunetix 100 SQLi, XSS 25m 85 
SQLmap 100 SQLi, XSS 2m 35sec 90 
Wapiti 100 SQLi, XSS 5m 40sec 70 
Paros 100 SQLi, XSS 6m 10sec 50 
Pixy 100 SQLi, XSS 4m 45 










Figure 5.5: Performance test of vulnerability scanners 
Table 5.6 lists the false positive rate comparison between vulnerability scanners, as well 
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False Positive Rate 
– FPR (%) 
Vulnerabilities 
detection rate (%) 
Our scanner 1.1 95 
Acunetix 1.8 85 
SQLmap 1.4 90 
Wapiti 5.2 70 
Paros 5.7 50 
Pixy 5.8 45 
Table 5.5: false positive rate comparison of vulnerability scanners 

















There are many web applications vulnerability scanners implemented for analyzing and 
detecting security holes in web applications. And because security is still one of the most 
important issues all across the globe in our thesis we have implemented a complete 
approach that scans for the most important vulnerabilities for web applications, namely 
SQL Injection and Cross Site Scripting (XSS). Since XSS and SQL injection 
vulnerabilities in web applications has huge risk not only for the web applications but 
also for users as well. We studied many existing approaches to detect and prevent these 
vulnerabilities in an application, giving a brief note on their advantages and 
disadvantages. All the approaches followed by different authors’ leads to a very 
interesting solution; however some failures are associated with almost each one of them 
at some point. Furthermore these scanners don’t support all web applications, many of 
them supports only known web applications with known vulnerabilities.  
In this thesis we are providing a vulnerability scanning and analyzing tool of various 
kinds of SQL injection and Cross Site Scripting (XSS) attacks. Our approach can be used 
with any web application not only the known ones. As well as it supports the most 
famous Database management servers, namely MS SQL Server, Oracle, and MySQL.  
We validate the proposed vulnerability scanner by developing experiments to measure its 
performance. We used some performance metrics to measure the performance of the 
scanner which include accuracy, false positive rate, and false negative rate. We also 
compare the performance results of it with performance of similar tools in the literature. 
Future Work 
- Develop a GUI for the scanner script, so make it easy for anyone to install and use 
the scanner. 
- Add full support for all known XSS detection techniques. 
- Implement a local proxy module to be included in the scanner work, which will 
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